How to argue with philosophers and fools alike

The dogmatic disease and the sceptical cure - The Balance Scale - Lessons from Diogenes the Cynic - Forgotten dust

The short answer to this question is not more than is necessary! This echoes a maxim used by Pyrrhonian sceptics since at least Sextus Empiricus for balancing arguments and counter-arguments: equipollence¹. This is an important concept in suspension of judgement, for if arguments can be made for both sides, and neither are evidently proven nor disproven, how can we assert our judgement without simply promoting a dogma? This letter deals with two ways of approaching dogmatists: The first is where something non-evident is dogmatically asserted and the second where philosophers try to infect the simple and practical with philosophy.

It is also neither sufficient nor moral to ignore dogmatists. Dogmas are afflictions that spread through a population and with sufficient time to grow become tyranny. The sceptic loves their neighbour and abhors tyranny- surely they would want to help cure their affliction? It is moral to offer doubt as medicine, as doubt serves life after all. Remember also the end-point is a suspension of judgement in the patient. At no point is the utterly naïve concept ‘win an argument’ relevant to idea discussed in this letter.

‘Not more’ or ‘not more this than that’ is an important maxim in the preservation of our tranquillity, as it puts boundaries on how much of out time to give to dogmatists in offering counter-arguments. Our counter-argument needs to be no more than the argument offered, even if this makes our counter-argument as weak as the dogma we are curing. These counter-arguments are not to disprove or change the mind of the dogmatist, only to offer an equally valid argument, leaving two dogmas in balance. It is in this balanced state the original dogma may return to the hole it came from.

The above applies to people who assert non-evident things, be they political, scientific, or in some other complex domain. There are also some who would infect the simple and straightforward world with philosophising by placing theory above practise and play word games with practical matters. In this sense they interfere with the practical criteria for living simply. These arguments are often better ignored, especially as they reach the point of absurdity, such as follows²:

“… a certain philosopher [Diogenes the Cynic], when the argument that motion is impossible was put to him, without a word, started to walk about, and people who follow the usual way of life proceed on journeys by land and sea… without paying any attention to the arguments about motion.”

It is important to remember not to be dragged into theorising arguments. Philosophisers will drag you down to their impractical level and beat you on word-smithing. Like real artisans, these students of daftness hone their craft over many years. Unlike real artisans, all their toil blows away like dust, collecting in dark corners of library basements.

We then offer these two lines of advice for dealing with the dogmatists. For those who argue the nature of non-evident, offer an equal but opposing argument and no more. For those trying to theorise over practical things, simply ignore, or demonstrate their folly. Our tranquil life is too valuable for such fights.

1. Sextus Empriricus, Outlines of Pyhhronism I, 188, 202

2. Sextus Empriricus, Outlines of Pyhhronism II, 229