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Can you switch off your judgement? Can you go an hour on social media without being sucked into a complete stranger's opinion? Does the 24-hour news cycle have its hooks in you? I'm not sure I'm alone in saying I have been distracted for longer than I'd care to admit after reading a daft opinion on Twitter that got under my skin. There is a certain state of mind that seems to be required to maintain tranquillity in the digital forums of the 21st Century.
In this essay I offer Pyrrhonian scepticism as an old solution to a modern ailment: the non-stop opinions of others, facilitated by the internet, social media and the 24-hour news cycle. Although the major work left to us concerning this philosophy, a multi-volume work by Second Century AD physician Sextus Empiricus is predominantly concerned with the epistomological side of scepticism, but its core it is a practical philosophy offering a simpler, smoother way of life through the practise of scepticism, not theory:
“Scepticism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearances and judgements, and thus—because of the equality of force in the objects and arguments opposed—to come first of all a suspension of judgement and then to mental tranquillity”
The above quote forms the core of the Pyrrhonnian system. It is a system to bring counterarguments to dogma and to bring doubt to the service of living a good and peaceful life. In Pyrrhonian terms, to not follow this practice leads people to unwarranted certainty in matters of opinion and become dogmatic in their beliefs. In this state, you risk living a life perpetually disturbed by the opinions of others. It is important to note that such counterarguments are never meant to convince someone. Counterarguments are supposed to be given only in an attempt to create doubt. Sextus describes this process of curing people of their certainty. Doubt and peace are the only goals. The simple Pyrrhonian formula plays out in myriad ways, to both the classical philosophers who discussed it and, as I will explore below, in the modern world.
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The system has its origins with Pyrrho of Elis, who lends his name to this variety of scepticism. In his biography by Diogenes Laërtius we can see the core: peace of mind with respect to opinions was deemed necessary to achieve a good life. Pyrrho's life took him from unsuccessful painter to high priest at the temple of Elis, before accompanying Alexander the Great to India (where he was potentially influenced by Buddhist philosophy) with Alexander the Great's army, before settling in Athens, where he was given citizenship.
Two stories relayed to us by Diogenes Laërtius offer a glimpse into Pyrrho's philosophy. One is that he would not move out of the way of carts in the street (his followers had to save him) as he doubted even his own senses. A second is of his philosophical tranquillity: On a ship during a storm he chastised his fellow passengers into being more like a pig on board who was happily eating from a trough, apparently undisturbed by the maelstrom. Despite his reported disdain over road safety, Pyrrho reportedly lived a simple life to the ripe age of ninety.
These stories show the breaking of ground for the Pyrrhonian system, which was expanded and refined by later philosophers. Although Pyrrho's epoché in the face of an animal-drawn cart is perhaps misplaced, later Pyrrhonian sceptics (such as Agrippa in the C1st BC) also rejected external signs ('semeion') as evidence to guide their actions, leading to an argument for the Apraxia Objection- how can you act at all when you doubt everything?
It is in the works of the C2nd AD doctor Sextus Empiricus that we have a recorded attempt to resolve these issues. Sextus writes of a major distinction in things apparent and non-apparent, things that compel us to act, and things that do not. Sextus does not do away with appearances. Rather, he tempers appearances by this distinction: Honey appears to taste sweet, rather than: Honey is sweet by its nature. This baseline of accepting appearances as guidance helps bypass the Apraxia Objection by also offering four practical criteria: The guidance of nature, the compulsion of feelings, the tradition of laws and customs and the instruction of the arts. Following these criteria allows a sceptic to maintain a simple life, whilst applying the arguments of Pyrrhonism to those who try to complicate it with over-philosophising in day-to-day activities.
Sextus would argue that as beliefs formed by these criteria can be attained simply through living life, and require no special instruction, they can be held undogmatically. They are of an unphilosophical philosophy. It is this contrast that perhaps describes the difference between a Pyrrhonian philosopher and a 'dogmatic' one: Beliefs that cannot be simply cultivated through everyday life, by common people, and require special philosophical instruction must be dealing with things non-apparent, which means they are beliefs held dogmatically. This is not to say Pyrrhonian scpeticism offers some form of naïve empiricism- even though honey appears sweet, this evidence can't be used in support of its sweet nature. Such positive assertions about the inherent nature of reality would be a dogmatic.
I have offered a brief outline of Pyrrhonian scepticism above, which is really a bare-bones summary for this branch of scepticism, following Sextus Empiricus' short treatise Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The remainder of this essay will deal with how this form of scepticism plays out in reality using the tools to create equipollent arguments and how this may be useful in the digital age of relentless information overload.
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Sextus' approach in Outlines of Pyrrhonism follows an almost medical theme at times. He identifies dogmatism as an ailment to be cured and sets out his medicines in a clear manner. These include certain techniques for creating isosthenia in matters of debate which were set out by prior sceptics. First are the ten Modes of Aenesidimus, a 1st Century BC philosopher. They are a list of fairly sensible arguments against the certainty in various matters. To give a brief overview: The same phenomena may be experienced differently between people (the second Mode), between animals (the first Mode) and between the same individual's impressions at different times (the third Mode). Others include psychological biases such as habit and custom making one less critical (the ninth Mode) or the change in physical context of changing our impressions of them (the sixth to eight Modes). Although the arguments seem to simply promote a relativistic view of the world, it is good to be reminded that all knowledge being relative is also a dogmatic belief- the Pyrrhonian sceptic is simply trying to promote doubt and a suspension of judgement.
There are a further five modes of the philosopher Agrippa, include endless dissent between intractable philosophers and between people in general, arguments of regression, the relativity between object and subject, underlying assumptions and circular reasoning. These, and the above, provide a catalogue of arguments to create isosthenia, which, Sextus claims, should cure the patient of their dogmatism. There are other modes of argument, some of which were probably developed in response to the philosophers of the second and third centuries. The point of them was to create an easily-remembered collection of counter-arguments. A modern set of Pyrrhonian Modes might look very different. Some stand the test of time- Agrippa's contributions bear strong similarity to the Münchhausen Trilemma, which used similarly framed arguments against the possibility of discovering the truth.
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I suggest the best way to evaluate these Pyrrhonian techniques is to try them out yourself. An interpretation (and one that I take) of Pyrrhonian scepticism is that it is an humanist endeavour that it offers a path to a simple and tranquil life. It is there to help. If this seems attractive try it! I'm sure there are more than enough vexatious opinions both on- and offline to test yourself on.
It is in the online sea of opinion that I believe Pyrrhonian scepticism may help us in particular find a way to live our lives a little better, without become a hermit with regards to the digital world. Two tropes of the last decade, especially with regards to politics online, thrives on a cycle of clickbait and outrage, feeding back upon itself, ad nauseam. Pyrrhonian scepticism may help break this cycle. A part of the Pyrrhonian formula that leads us through a suspension of judement to tranquility is aphasia, a lack of speech on the part of the sceptic where one realises no assertion can be made.
It is this Pyrrhonian aphasia which may break the cycle of wordsmithery. Sextus' arsenal of ways to construct counterarguments may be useful for inducing a suspension of judgement in others or yourself, but it is the step before we achieve our ataraxia that may improve the content of the online world. Aphasia is a state of mind in the context of Pyrrhonism that has been described as a reflective state of non-assertion, which is as attitude diametrically opposed to social-media.
An important point is whether you seek to break that cycle for yourself, or for others. Should you argue to induce a suspension of judgement in yourself, or, like the physician Sextus, do you seek to cure it in others? I am not convinced the latter is well suited to online discourse. I'm not sure quoting the arguments of Agrippa against anonymous strangers online will do much for anyone's mental tranquillity. However, they can be used for oneself, as reminders of the limits of ones own certainty.
A final point in this short journey from the formulation of Pyrrhonism scepticism to some potential modern applications is the overlooked importance of mischief and humour that accompanies wisdom. For this, we must return to the first follower of Pyrrho, Timon of Phlius, whose work we know only from fragments. An Hellenic Byron, he wrote satiric verse and subjected the philosophers of his era to no end of mockery, even those today still held in high regard. He referred to Aristotle's work as “painful thoughtlessness”, called Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic School “no more intelligent than a banjo” and the Stoic school in general “...a cloud of paupers. The most beggardly and insignificant of townsmen”.
Of course, such insults would not go down well in online discourse, but the spirit of Timon's message is alive- Dogmatists, by taking their own world-view far too seriously are a nuisance at best and tyrannical at their worst. Satire has long had an important role in keeping people honest and the powerful humble. Besides this, a sceptic that has achieved mental tranquility should be cheerful. After all, is this not the end we set out to achieve?
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I have laid out a brief history and description of the Pyrrhonian scepticism, with some modern, practical applications of this way of thinking. Sextus' works are dense with fascinating insights not only into this unique branch of Hellenistic philosophy, but also provides a fascinating and in-depth record of other Hellenic philosophy. For example, by recording his objections to the physics and logic of the original Stoics of Athens, Sextus has inadvertently provided us with one of the few sources of these subjects.
Although less well known by its contemporary schools like the Peripatetics, the Academy or the Stoics, Pyrrhonian scepticism played an historical role in the scepticism of the early Enlightenment. Via Michel de Montaigne, whose work, particularly the essay Apology for Raymond Sebond revitalised an interest in Pyrrhonism with the French Nouveux Pyrrhoniens, who influenced René Descartes, a founding figure of modern science.
Much of what I have written in this essay is based on Sextus' first book Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which offers exactly what the title suggests. The remaining volumes Sextus qrote are a treasure-trove of the application of the sceptical Modes to classical philosophies to which I cannot do justice here, but I am sure that to a modern reader with an interest in the classics, these would prove fascinating.
Further Reading
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism. This work provides exactly what the title suggests. The essay borrows most heavily from this source, which, even in Sextus' dry style, offers the best introduction to Pyrrhonian Scepticism.
Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho and Timon. In these biographies we not only get an idea of how these philosophers lived, but the biography of Pyrrho is one of only two (the other being the stoic Zeno) biographies that includes a full description of their philosphical system. Diogenes Laertius also litters his biographies with lines from Timon's satires, from works otherwise lost.
Michel de Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond. The longest of the essays by the writer Montaigne, this outlines his view on scepticism, bringing Pyrrhonian thinking into the Renaissance. Full of interesting arguments in its own right, it also brought the work of Sextus Empiricus to a contemporary audience.
Miles F. Burnyeat, Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism? This paper offers one of the better arguments against Pyrrhonian scepticism, including a formulation of the Apraxia Objection.
For me, the tranquility doesn't come from the suspension of judgement but from being freed of the expense of time and effort required to make one. Plus, if I don't declare things, then they can't subsequently knock me over, further down the road, because I haven't mistakenly declared and defined them to be something they're not.
Unlike "seeking", there's no place in the exploration of reality for the dualisms of belief and judgement which makes for great speed and and the covering of great distances with regard to newness. Not to mention - the very idea of declaring any of the various aspects of reality to be "this" or "that" is a bit like telling reality to sit down and shut up - lol
“Scepticism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearances and judgements, and thus—because of the equality of force in the objects and arguments opposed—to come first of all a suspension of judgement and then to mental tranquillity”
Reminds me of Husserl's epoché technique :-).